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SUMMARY 
Conspiracy theories have been surging worldwide since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Not only can they have considerable negaAve impact on a societal level, they are also capable of 
disrupAng individual lives. Along commonly asked quesAons, this extended factsheet provides an 
overview of socio-psychological theories that explain belief in conspiracy theories in general. This 
framework is then applied to empirical data on the QAnon conspiracy movement in order to 
illustrate theoreAcal assumpAons. AIer a brief introducAon of the concept of conspiracy mindset 
and related demographic groups, the focus is on the fulfillment of epistemic, existenAal and social 
moAves from a mulAtude of perspecAves: media landscapes, communiAes, ideological structures, 
addicAon, and gamificaAon. The factsheet is concluded with a variety of opAons for prevenAon and 
miAgaAon, and a discussion on the implicaAons for the future of society in the context of deep 
fakes and the post-truth world. 
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THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES: 
IS “Q” A WARNING SIGN FOR THE FUTURE? 
“What we've seen is what some people call truth decay. Something that's been accelerated by outgoing 
President Trump, the sense that not only do we not have to tell the truth, but the truth doesn't even maOer.” 
(Barack Obama) 
C onspiracy theories are anything but new, yet for a while now, they have been increasingly becoming popular, affecAng more and more people and their environment. With a pandemic that brought along 
a number of changes in our way of life, the upAck in various conspiracy beliefs has become the center of 
aYenAon: previously being frowned upon and seen as a thing only in some fringes of society, mulAple 
conspiracy beliefs are now widely accepted (Olito 2020), making their way into the highest level of poliAcs 
in mulAple Western countries (BBC 2020; Focus 2020), tearing families and communiAes apart (Jaffe & Del 
Real 2021), as well as risking lives and democracies (Gilbert 2021a; Poniewozik 2021). 
In 2020, the size of Q Anon  followers in Germany were esAmated to be around 200 000 (Bennhold 2020); 1
the largest in the non-English-speaking world. Similarly, some experts claim that there are a few hundred 
thousand “Anons” in France (Gilbert 2021b). Yet unlike in the USA, where security agencies see Q as a 
domesAc terror threat, French experts rather perceive the movement as a threat to democracy, and less as 
a potenAal for violence. In Austria, security authoriAes keep an eye on the Austrian Q scene as a movement 
due to its potenAal for violence and societal disrupAon (Der Standard 2020). Even besides Q, a recent study 
by the InsAtut Market-Agent found that 3 out of 10 Austrian think that there may be more truth to 
conspiracy theories than authoriAes acknowledge (Tschiderer 2020). 
In the online media landscape, a vast amount of arAcles were published recently with bits of informaAon on 
conspiracy theories. Many have interviewed experts, but fell short of providing a comprehensive yet 
compact explanaAon for the mechanisms of conspiracies. When it comes to the infamous topic of Q, most 
of the reporAng focuses on parAcular individuals (Rosenberg 2021), the claims of Q (Caffier 2018), 
spreading counter-conspiracies (Gilbert 2021c), or on ridiculing its followers in general. MulAple arAcles in 
the Austrian press explain the history and main premises of the Q ideology (Tschiderer, 2020), bring some 
examples of Anons on various demonstraAons (Profil 2021), and even connect these circles to right-wing 
extremists (Der Standard 2020). Yet barely any of these elaborate on the complex psychological 
mechanisms behind this kind of radicalizaAon. 
This gap oIen leaves readers with a series of unanswered quesAons: how and why do people believe 
seemingly ridiculous claims? Which characterisAcs make individuals prone to conspiracy thinking? Why is it 
difficult to disprove and disrupt conspiracy theories? What is the role of the media and addicAon in 
embracing and maintaining conspiracy beliefs? How do conspiracy communiAes shape idenAAes? What can 
one do to prevent or miAgate conspiracy thinking? What are the implicaAons for the future of society and 
poliAcal extremism? 
There are a lot of angles to approach conspiracy theories from in order to answer the above listed quesAons 
(BuYer 2020). Given the recent increase in the number of believers of conspiracy theories, and the 
subsequent confusion in society about how one can believe conspiracies, this extended factsheet will 
aYempt to provide answers by summarizing exisAng knowledge on mechanisms of conspiracy theories in 
general — without claiming to be exhausXve — from a socio-psychological perspecAve. While the presented 
theories are applicable to all sorts of conspiracies in general, this factsheet will also uAlize open-source data 
 While this conspiracy theory is mostly known as QAnon, the Q community itself rejects that term. On the one hand, there is Q, 1
regardless whether it is one person or multiple individuals; on the other hand, there are the so-called Anons, i.e. anonymous people 
that believe in the conspiracies spread by the entity known as Q. The term QAnon is hence questionable and will not be used.
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on online Q communiAes to illustrate and amend the general theoreAcal assumpAons with empirical 
evidence and analyAcal observaAons by the author. The paper is concluded with a discussion on the long-
term societal implicaAons of trends that led to the recent surge of conspiracy theories. 
WHAT ARE CONSPIRACY THEORIES? 
D efining key terms in this context is crucial, given the negaAve connotaAons and poliAcal weaponizaAon of the term conspiracy (theory), oIen used by public actors to delegiAmize criAcism and shiI the focus 
to the accuser from the accused. Given that the world is complex, random coincidences are inevitable 
(Sprenger et al. 2021). In other words: conspiracies do happen and revealing conspiracy theories is not 
necessarily a negaAve thing. Real conspiracies are however uncovered by invesAgaAve reporters, 
whistleblowers, or scienAsts; and not unknown sources on social media. Hence, it is all the more important 
to define what conspiracies are. According to Douglas et al. (2019), “conspiracy theories are aYempts to 
explain the ulAmate causes of significant social and poliAcal events and circumstances with claims of secret 
plots by two or more powerful actors”, whereas these secret plots are usually perceived as unlawful or 
malevolent (Klein & Nera 2020) and against the common good (Uscinski et al. 2016). 
ARE CONSPIRACY THEORIES ALWAYS EVIL AND HARMFUL? 
C onspiracy theories have both benefits and negaAve effects on society and poliAcs. On the posiAve side, they highlight gaps and inconsistencies in official posiAons and communicaAon, might open up valuable 
discussions, or potenAally uncover real conspiracies. They also encourage individuals to engage with 
societal and poliAcal quesAons (GorveY 2020). An interesAng argument from Douglas et al. (2019) is that 
conspiracy theories are actually symptoms, not causes of social dysfuncAon, hence they highlight real 
issues, such as class-based alienaAon. However, these researchers also found that negaHve aspects 
outweigh the benefits by far: conspiracy theories tend to lead to prejudice towards parAcular groups, 
science denial, decreased poliAcal trust and engagement, as well as harmful health-related choices, such as 
the rejecAon of vaccines, decreased trust in medical professionals and the subsequent shiI towards 
unconvenAonal medicine. In some cases, they may even lead to radicalisaAon and violence (Lee 2020), 
given that there is a broad overlap between extremist groups and conspiracy theories. A study has also 
found that higher levels of conspiracy thinking correlate with higher levels of jusAfying violence to express 
disagreement with the government (Douglas et al. 2019). In sum, conspiracy theories are more likely to be 
harmful than beneficial, both on individual and societal levels. 
ARE SOME PEOPLE MORE PRONE TO CONSPIRACY THINKING? 
T he idea of some individuals having a tendency of conspiracy thinking or even a conspiracy mindset (other terms used: conspiracy predisposiXon, conspiracist ideaXon, conspiracy mentality, conspiracy 
worldview) has been gaining tracAon lately (ibid.). Such concepts imply that individuals who believe in one 
conspiracy theory are more likely to believe other unrelated conspiracy theories. This in turn suggests that 
they may tend to interpret events through conspiraAonal frames due to a bias against certain groups that 
are perceived as powerful. For instance, regressions found that those with stronger conspiraAonal 
predisposiAons are more likely to believe the media is biased than those with weaker predisposiAons 
(Uscinski et al. 2016). As a high-profile example, Michael Flynn Jr., a key player in the Q movement and the 
Capitol insurrecAon (Steakin et al. 2021), was associated with the term “Flynn facts” by colleagues during 
his directorship of the D.I.A. (Rosenberg 2021), as a reacAon to the large number of dubious asserAons 
made by him which suggests a conspiracy mindset. Shortly, there is a known psychological feature that 
makes certain individuals more likely to believe in conspiracies. 
AMONG WHICH DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS IS A CONSPIRACY MINDSET THE MOST PREVALENT? 
G iven that social psychologists established the existence of a conspiracy mindset, the next quesAon is: among which demographic is a conspiracy mindset prevalent? The answer is rather blurry. The drivers 
of the conspiracy predisposiAon remain largely disputed; similarly to the lack of characterisAcs that would 
confidently predict vulnerability to violent radicalizaAon. However, studies found that higher levels of 
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conspiracy thinking correlate with lower levels of educaHon (media literacy in parXcular), lower levels of 
income, unemployment, being unmarried, having weaker social networks and even belonging to ethnic 
minoriHes (Douglas et al. 2019). Yet considering how broad and general these groups are, the specific 
mechanisms behind these correlaAons are unclear. In the case of individuals with lower educaAon, experts 
presume that the reason is the decreased analyAcal thinking and the increased tendency to prefer simple 
soluAons for societal problems (van Prooijen et al. 2020). At the same Ame, Uscinski et al. (2016) believe 
that poliAcal socializaAon and psychological traits are the most important factors for conspiraAonal 
predisposiAons. Their findings show that those socialized not to trust mainstream insAtuAons, and those 
that have psychological traits that overwhelm mainstream poliAcal socializing are more likely to be on the 
stronger side of the conspiracy thinking conAnuum. 
Based on a limited database by the START NaAonal ConsorAum for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism on Q Anon offenders in the USA (Jensen & Kane 2020), these factors are quesAonable; albeit 
being a conspiracy theorist and being an offender are two different things. The age of offenders was largely 
mixed between 22 and 71 (avg.: 41), with only 21% of the sample being female; although Loonourow 
(2020) and other experts claim that women consAtute the majority of the general Q community based on 
their observaAons. About 37,5% of offenders were married and 48,2% were parents or legal guardians of 
children. Surprisingly, 19,6% had a military or law enforcement background. Regarding their employment, 
17,8% were unemployed at the Ame of the crime, and 33,9% had a criminal record already for non-
ideologically moAvated crimes. Thus so far, no personal features appear to be sufficient or necessary. 
However, one aYribute appears to be overrepresented among offenders related to the Q ideology 
compared to the general populaAon: mental health issues, parAcularly related to personal trauma. 68% of 
those that commiYed crimes before and aIer the Capitol riot had mental health issues, including PTSD, 
paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and Munchausen syndrome by proxy. Around 44% of the 31 Q 
offenders “who commiYed crimes before and aIer the Capitol riot radicalized aIer experiencing a 
traumaAc event”, such as deaths of loved ones or abuse (emoAonal, sexual, physical). An astonishing 83% of 
the female Q offenders experienced “trauma prior to their radicalizaAon that involved the physical and/or 
sexual abuse of their children by a romanAc partner or family member.“, likely explaining what drew them to 
the conspiracy: the agenda of protecAng and saving children. (Jensen & Kane 2020) In fact, women have 
become a leading force behind the spread of the Q conspiracy in summer 2020 (Loonourow 2020). As for 
Austria, there is no publicly available data on who are Q followers, parAcularly because a stand-alone Q 
scene as such, like in the USA, does not yet exist. However, Anons are usually found among 
“Staatsverweigerer” and — recently — corona skepAcs (Puls24 2021). To sum things up, academics claim 
that lower levels of educaAon and lower socio-economic status correlate with conspiracy mindset, while 
among Q offenders, personal trauma and mental health issues appear to be significant. 
THE DESIRE-TRIAD BEHIND CONSPIRACY THINKING: UNDERSTANDING — CONTROL — POSITIVE SOCIAL IMAGE 
A s illustrated above, descripAve theories seem to be rather insufficient for explaining belief in conspiracy theories, similarly to violent extremism. However, a recent theory — presented by Douglas 
et al. (2019) — is much more promising, as it argues that conspiracy thinking can be explained by the 
saAsfacAon of three parAcular social-psychological moAves: the desire to understand something (epistemic), 
the desire for control (existence), and the desire to maintain a posiAve image (social). 
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(1) EPISTEMIC MOTIVES 
So-called epistemic moHves are our desire to understand the world using our prior beliefs. In other words, 
when processing new informaAon, we inherently strive to uphold our pre-exisAng views. Conspiracy 
theories can fulfill this moAve by providing a framework of internally consistent ideas that reduce 
uncertainty and contradicAon while preserving previous beliefs. This is most likely when new informaAon is 
incomplete or challenges our views, suggesAng that conspiracy beliefs may be a product of biased 
assimilaAon, i.e. an individual accepAng informaAon which supports pre-exisAng beliefs yet rejecAng 
informaAon that goes against one’s views. At the same Ame, this also implies that conspiracy theories are 
more prevalent in uncertain situaAons or among people that tend to look for meaning in their everyday 
environment (e.g. believers of supernatural phenomena). In addiAon to uncertainty, boredom and curiosity 
are also good predictors: those who are bored or are looking for cogniAve closure (i.e. our understanding of 
a situaAon is perceived to be incomplete), parAcularly when no official explanaAon is given, also tend to 
turn to conspiracy beliefs to fulfill epistemic moAves. ParAcularly during the pandemic, people have had 
increased freeAme at hand (Wesolowski 2021), coupled with loneliness, and a desire to understand 
something new (i.e. a pandemic), hence they oIen ended up browsing the internet and finding conspiracy 
groups on social media. In short, research suggests that when we are looking for answers and meaning — 
regardless whether out of uncertainty, boredom, curiosity —, we inherently interpret new informaAon in a 
way that is in accordance with our prior beliefs; yet in cases where we lack cogniAve means to do so or if 
new informaAon contradicts our pre-exisAng beliefs, we turn to conspiracy theories. (Dougas et al. 2019) 
For instance, a person that is afraid of needles is more likely to look for theories online that reinforce one’s 
pre-exisAng belief, thereby oIen ending up with anA-vaccinaAon conspiracies (Wesolowski 2021). In the 
case of Q, most Anons have already been having long-term grievances related to the general distrust 
towards the establishment and elites. This nudges the brain towards interpreAng new informaAon in a way 
that confirms this: that poliAcians are part of an evil plan which exploits children. 
(2) EXISTENTIAL MOTIVES 
Conspiracy theories can also be appealing in situaAons where we perceive our existenAal needs to be under 
threat, thereby looking to saAsfy our existenHal moHves. The main mechanism in this context is the 
individual lacking agency (i.e. feeling powerless), which is then reclaimed by turning to conspiracy beliefs 
that reject mainstream accounts and create an illusion of having a beYer account. Especially nowadays, 
when the world is oIen depicted as being in an age of uncertainty, it is easy to feel like one is losing control. 
There are a number of scenarios and circumstances under which individuals become more prone to draw 
on conspiracies in order to fulfill existenAal moAves. Among these are individuals who feel alienated and 
disconnected from the poliAcal system, who struggle to understand the social world, and even those who 
overesAmate their ability to understand complex phenomena. (Douglas et al. 2019) In such cases, 
conspiracies offer a “compensatory fantasy” by the narraAve that nothing is coincidental and everything is 
meaningful, all Aed to a conspiracy (Lee 2020). This helps the individual restore order to a complex poliAcal 
and societal field. While finding causal connecAons is an evoluAonary cogniAve process called paYern 
percepAon, which helps us survive (e.g. by idenAfying paYerns such as large predators are dangerous), the 
issue is that people also tend to perceive causal connecAons that are not there, resulAng in illusory paeern 
percepHon (van Prooijen et al. 2020). Closely related to this (and correlaAng with conspiracy beliefs) is 
teleological thinking, which is the tendency to aYribute a cause to a natural event, e.g. considering the 
rainbow at the top of a mountain as a reward (ibid.). 
Control and agency are hence key existenAal factors in this context: experiments that strengthened people’s 
sense of control have led to reduced conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al. 2019). Vice versa, the perceived lack 
of control (i.e. powerlessness) increases conspiracy beliefs. Researchers found that it is parAcularly the 
perceived low power to achieve socio-poliAcal goals, and not personal goals, which triggers a feeling of 
powerlessness, leading to conspiracy thinking (Imhoff & Lamberty 2020). For instance, aIer US elecAons, 
supporters of the party that won the elecAon scored lower on elecAon-related conspiracy beliefs, and 
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supporters of the party that lost scored higher. This perceived lack of one’s agency was oIen found to be 
paired with an overesAmaAon of other’s agency, i.e. when people detect agency in cases where none exists 
(van Prooijen et al. 2020). Conspiracy theories rely on this mechanism by definiAon: people believe that a 
group of actors conspire in secret for harmful purposes. To compensate the perceived imbalance between 
others’ and one’s agency, conspiracy theories tend to make believers feel as if they were heroes of the 
world that have special knowledge to fight the common enemy (Lee 2020). 
Indeed, perceived vicAmhood and being under aYack is a common paYern among conspiracies, establishing 
a narraAve of everyday people being the vicAms and main targets of elites. This acAvates a cogniAve 
reacAon to fight back for survival under the moYo of this being the last chance. Accordingly, former Anon 
Jitarth Jadeja, who spent 2 years in the movement, claims that the biggest danger in Q lies therein, that 
followers believe there is an existenAal threat to their lives: a baYle between good and evil (CNN 2020). 
Akin to that, another former, Ashley Vanderbilt, said that she has been in a “constant state of fear and 
panic” (Good Morning America 2021). Q gave them control by making them believe that there is a plan, and 
in the end, everything will be all right. 
Perceived powerlessness can however also take place in situaAons where one is experiencing a major loss 
of control in life over one’s own beliefs, resulAng in uncertainty. This type of lack of control is especially 
characterisAc aIer personal trauma. In situaAons where our existenAal needs appear to be under threat 
while feeling powerless to do anything about it, conspiracies can help make sense of everything. By doing 
so, we reclaim control, especially if our peers share and confirm these conspiracy beliefs. One prevalent 
mechanism in this context is drawing on conspiracies to cope with perceived threats “by making abstract 
risk more concrete and by focusing blame on a set of conspirators” (Douglas et al. 2019). This process 
provides a certain sense of stability, according to neuroscienAst Franca Parianen (Wesolowski 2021). 
The direcAon of causality between power and conspiracies remains a quesAon. Studies about the 
compensatory hypothesis found that the feeling of powerlessness leads to conspiracy beliefs because 
conspiracies suggest that negaAve events in one’s life are caused by external forces (conspiracies) (Imhoff & 
Lamberty 2020). ConfirmaAon bias may also contribute to this effect, given that the percepAon of being 
powerless aligns with conspiracy theories that usually depict the everyday person as a vicAm. To address 
this, believing in conspiracy beliefs empowers the individual of seeing through the conspiracy, which allows 
the individual to take poliAcal (or violent) acAon instead of resignaAon. On the other hand, the 
reinforcement hypothesis supposes that the direcAon of causality goes from conspiracy theories to 
powerlessness, given that conspiracies mostly portray the world being run by a small elite, making one feel 
powerless. These two hypotheses may even turn into a downward spiral. Either way, it is interesAng to note 
that power is also strongly involved in the correlaAon between educaAon, knowledge, and conspiracy 
beliefs (ibid.). EducaAon and knowledge can be perceived as power, as they make the individual feel as if 
they can exert control over life by gaining the skills needed to influence social environment. It is thus 
presumed that the correlaAon between educaAon and conspiracy beliefs is at least parAally mediated by 
perceived power. This would explain why people with lower educaAon tend to believe in conspiracy 
theories to a greater extent: because they feel powerless, and not directly because they are less intelligent. 
Perceived power and posiXve self-image on a Q board: the illusion of influencing the biggest event in human history. 
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(3) SOCIAL MOTIVES 
Feeling intelligent or not is also related to the third, social moHve. As human beings, we tend to desire to 
maintain a posiHve image of ourselves. According to the beYer-than-average effect of social psychology, 
people in general always compare themselves to others and they always perceive themselves as beYer than 
other in just about everything they care about, regardless whether that is true or not (Payne 2020). AIer all, 
it is painful to feel like one is at the boYom. The most prevalent coping mechanism for that is shiIing how 
one sees the world, for instance by claiming that the system is rigged. When things are going well, people 
tend to perceive it as a personal success due to their skills and abiliAes, yet when people struggle, they 
interpret it primarily as the result of external obstacles. Therefore, groups that are perceived as important 
yet undervalued and underprivileged tend to give rise to senAments of being the vicAm of a conspiracy. 
(ibid.) At the same Ame, conspiracy theories further saAsfy this social moAve by making one feel superior 
and special to others through the illusion of possessing rare knowledge. This addresses the social-
psychological need of feeling unique as well. Such mechanisms result in collecAve narcissism (feeling 
superior as a group): when in-group posiAvity is paired with a perceived under-appreciaAon, most usually 
occurring in low-status groups, it can give birth to conspiracy beliefs that validate the in-group by explaining 
the low status and raises the group above others by perceived uniqueness (Douglas et al. 2019). This is 
supported by findings that conspiracy beliefs are more prevalent in groups with low social standing and liYle 
power in society, e.g. minoriAes or marginalized groups such as migrants (Imhoff & Lamberty 2020). 
This mechanism is also applicable to individuals. For instance, Ashley Vanderbilt had just lost her job and 
felt depressed when she started liking pro-Trump and anA-Biden posts on social media. Shortly aIer, the 
algorithm recommended her parAcular TikToks, that were about Q conspiracies. She immediately felt like 
these short videos were telling her things that nobody else knew (i.e. making her feeling unique), which was 
the main reason why she conAnued to go down the so-called rabbit hole. (O’Sullivan 2021) This is also 
where the “sheep” narraAve comes from: the self-percepAon of being beYer than the rest. 
Summed up, social psychologists argue that conspiracy thinking is closely related to the saAsfacAon of three 
basic psychological desires, namely to understand new informaAon without contradicAng pre-exisAng 
beliefs (epistemic moAve), to establish and maintain control over our lives (existenAal moAve), and to 
maintain a posiAve image of ourselves (social moAve). The empirical data from interviews with former 
Anons supports this thesis, with each three moAve playing a central role in their processes of radicalizaAon. 
WHAT ARE THE PREDICTORS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THESE MECHANISMS? 
W hile the desire-triad explains the core of conspiracy thinking, a crucial quesAon sAll unanswered is under what circumstances these socio-psychological processes are triggered, considering that the 
“risk group” is fairly broad. There are a number of factors to consider, such as strong, negaAve emoAons; 
personal crises; a perceived threat to a subjecAvely important peer-group; and — most importantly — a 
poliAcal predisposiAon that matches the parAcular conspiracy. 
As already described above, perceived uncertainty, loss of control, boredom, perceived threats, feeling 
powerless as well as marginalized (both on a personal and group level) are likely to trigger these 
mechanisms. Researchers also found that both perceived threats to one’s societal status quo and the feeling 
of fear tend to increase conspiraAonal thinking, mediated by intuiAve (i.e. not necessarily raAonal) thinking 
(van Prooijen et al. 2020). This effect is further amplified when any of the listed factors — e.g. fear, 
perceived threat — affect one’s peer-group (Paul & MaYhews 2016). In some cases, involved factors even 
create a spiral: threats tend to make people angry, and angry messages — regardless whether true or not — 
have a higher likelihood to be believed by angry people. In sum, a scenario that poses a high level of risk of 
embracing conspiracy theories would be one in which (1) emoAonalized informaAon (2) from a trusted 
source makes an individual (3) perceive a legiAmate outside threat (4) to an important peer-group; (5) this 
threat is rather unknown and (6) liYle can be done against it; and (7) the individual is in an emoAonal state 
of mind (be it anger or fear) aIer experiencing a personal trauma or crisis recently. The key word is 
perceive: none of the above menAoned criterion need to be objecAvely true to trigger conspiracy thinking. 
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What maYers is how the parAcular individual perceives the situaAon, which is heavily affected by a variety 
of psychological biases and cogniAve factors. 
In fact, fear, anxiety, depression, uncertainty, inconsistencies about the pandemic, as well as feeling 
hopeless aIer losing her own business due to restricAons and not knowing what to do are what Melissa 
Rein Lively named as the main drivers behind her radicalizaAon pertaining to Q (CNN 2021b). Similarly, 
another former Anon blames the “general state of confusion and paranoia in our lives” for geung into Q 
conspiracies (CNN 2021d). 
Yet revisiAng epistemic moAves — that make us want to interpret the world in accordance with our prior 
beliefs —, a key quesAon remains: if one’s beliefs are not conspiraXonal already, why would one interpret 
new informaXon through a conspiraXonal frame? The answer is simple: because new informaAon 
contradicts a parAcular set of our beliefs that we consider to be highly important to us. It is cogniAvely less 
costly to find a conspiracy that allows us to keep these views unchanged. This leads to the main 
requirement of conspiracy thinking: poliHcal predisposiHon. When it comes to ideology and poliAcs, 
mulAple studies found that conspiracy beliefs must align with pre-exisAng beliefs (poliXcal pre-disposiXon) 
to be embraced (Douglas et al. 2019). These findings also suggest that conspiracy beliefs are the most 
prevalent at the two ends — i.e. the extremes — of the poliAcal spectrum, creaAng a U-shape, implying that 
conspiracy beliefs might be a consequence of extremism (or at least very strong poliAcal views), or vice 
versa (ibid.). For instance, people tend to believe conspiracy beliefs about opposing parAes, but very rarely 
about their own party. A survey in the USA supports this theory: parAsanship was found to drive 
conspiraAonal thinking, as expected (Uscinski et al. 2016). Republicans were more likely to believe in 
conspiracies that portray Democrats and their allies (“liberals”) as conspirators. Hence, conspiracy theories 
require the individual to score high on both the conspiraAonal predisposiAon conAnuum and the poliAcal 
predisposiAon which is in accordance with the parAcular conspiracy theory. However, parAsanship does not 
seem to correlate with a conspiracy mindset; i.e., Democrats and Republicans were equally predisposed 
toward conspiraAonal thinking. On the posiAve side, this implies that in order for a conspiracy to overtake 
the enAre society, it would have to be non-parAsan or it would have to make parAsan people believe that 
their own party is conspiring. (ibid.) 
The previously introduced Ashley Vanderbilt has never been watching news or reading newspapers in her 
life, yet she was a life-long Republican voter (O’Sullivan 2021). In Europe, exisAng anA-establishment 
senAment is presumed to have contributed to the spread of the Q conspiracy, parAcularly in the context of 
the pandemic (ScoY 2020). Similarly, Brodnig claims that the reason why Q could spread in Austria is 
Trump’s popularity prior to Q: many Austrians showed a strong liking towards Trump (Puls24 2021). 
In short, there is a number of factors and circumstances related to the desire-triad that increase the 
chances of conspiracy thinking, e.g. perceived threats and a highly emoAonal mindset among others. 
However, the individual must also have a certain poliAcal predisposiAon that aligns with the conspiracy in 
order to trigger the social-psychological process of embracing conspiracy theories. 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF (SOCIAL) MEDIA? 
C onspiracy theories do not emerge and spread in a vacuum; on the contrary, they require an adequate medium, which raises the quesAon on what role (social) media plays and how modern paYerns of 
informaAon consumpAon affect conspiracy theories. Thanks to technological innovaAon, today’s media 
landscape not only allows consumers to receive and decode new informaAon, but also to add new meaning 
and act as a source of informaAon. This decentralized informaAon system coincides with the recently 
emerged data economy, in which clicks serve as currency, creaAng a ferAle ground for conspiracy theories. 
For a long Ame, communicaAon experts thought that mass media delivers a complete product to the 
(passive) people, which is received as it is wriYen. However, researchers have meanwhile found that 
consumers are not merely passive recipients, but are instead acAve by decoding and reconstrucAng the 
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media’s informaAon, and eventually even producing a different meaning (Aupers 2020). From this 
perspecAve, conspiracy theories can be seen as opposiAonal reading of mass media texts, that are 
deconstructed and then given a new meaning in an aYempt to resist alleged media control. This resistance 
can be stretched to the extent where the term “nothing is what it seems” applies, in that believers of 
conspiracies decode every single piece of informaAon and produce their own message which contradicts 
the original. In light of this, Aupers (2020) claims that conspiracy theory communiAes are “assembling 
informaAon, collecAng data, revising texts and are relentlessly involved in interpreAve pracAces to make 
sense of events”. In the end, their theories oIen end up being inconsistent, non-conclusive and unstable 
chains of interpretaAons of possible conspiracies.  
This process of decoding and recoding oIen involves hidden codes, that are presumed to be part of a 
broader system. Believers of conspiracy theories perceive “deep structures underneath the surface of what 
is said, wriYen or visualised in the text and, in a typical modernist way, reduce every empirical detail to the 
underlying theory” (ibid.). In other words, instead of accepAng the meaning of a message, they focus on 
what it hides; thus as a paradox, transparency is understood as concealment, and this interpreAve process 
aYempts to make the invisible visible. 
While conspiracy theories have been around for centuries, it is social media that has taken the decoding 
and encoding process to the next level. With the emergence of social media, the disAncAon between 
experts and amateurs, as well as between established truth and alternaAve facts has been eroding. (ibid.) 
Nowadays, anyone with a device and internet connecAon can engage in this parAcipatory decoding/
encoding pracAce of producing knowledge, and even share it immediately with others. This marks another 
turn in the development of audience recepAon, namely the turn from acAve to interacAve audiences: 
people do not only take acAve part in interpreAng and deconstrucAng messages, they also engage in 
negoAaAon and co-producAon by becoming a part of the communicaAon chain, i.e. by decoding a message, 
encoding it into a conspiracy theory, and sharing it with others. InformaAon has thus become constantly 
renegoAated and transformed during circulaAon, and at the same Ame, the sources we get our news from 
these days have mulAplied, with severe implicaAons. (ibid.) 
This decentralized informaAon landscape created biases. When a message is spread by a large number of 
sources, individuals tend to show more trust and confidence in the informaAon, regardless of the credibility 
of such sources (Paul & MaYhews 2016). This bias can easily be weaponized, whether strategically or 
unconsciously. Moreover, when the volume of informaAon is low, people tend to prefer experts, yet with 
high volumes, crowd-sourced and user-generated informaAon tends to be preferred (ibid.). In addiAon to 
volume, researchers also found that consumers tend to judge a source’s credibility based on how credible 
others perceive the source to be (ibid.). As a result, peers aYacking a source’s trustworthiness decreases 
credibility in the eye of the consumer, and makes it less likely that the consumer will act on the informaAon 
distributed by that source. Again, it is percepAon that maYers: social media algorithms are known to create 
echo chambers by feeding the reader content that echos and reinforces the parAcular individual’s pre-
exisAng beliefs while keeping other views away, paving the way for the spread of conspiracies. 
WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO FRINGE INFORMATION SOURCES? 
F or the successful emergence of the decentralized informaAon landscape, tradiAonal media had to have struggled in the first place. Yet what triggered the resistance to mass media? When and how did it lose 
credibility? With the shiI to social media and online news plavorms, clicks and engagement now serve as 
currency. Hence, it is no surprise that public actors — that meanwhile oIen serve as sources of informaAon 
— and journalists reacted to this trend: informaAon which warrants an emoAonal reacAon is much more 
likely to be passed on, regardless whether it is true or not (ibid.). Consequently, journalism shiIed “from a 
theoreAcally neutral means of “manufacturing consent” into a poliAcal cause that people are rallied into 
supporAng, usually by inciAng them to some form of outrage” (Hussein 2021). Yet not only do outlets need 
to keep their readers saAsfied, but, as a result of the modaliAes of social media, they also need to keep 
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readers engaged. Making people outraged and angry is one of the best ways to keep people engaged. 
Hence to get and keep someone’s aYenAon, dramaAzaAon and amplificaAon are useful means. These 
changes led to what Mir calls postjournalism: a decrease in ethical standards, which “will produce mobs 
whose rage is incomprehensible to those outside their bubbles” (ibid.). The consequences according to 
Hussain (2021) are increasing polarizaAon and the amplificaAon of extremes, which drives outlets against 
each other in compeAAon for audience.  
Anons’ strong opinion about mainstream media on a Q board. 
SAll, there are limits as to how far mainstream outlets can push their boundaries while trying to get readers’ 
engagement, which is how fringe outlets became successful: with no reputaAon to lose, they were able to 
produce even more outrageous content. In this context, a key characterisAc of conspiracy theories is that 
conspiracies oIen end up creaAng a slippery slope (Loonourow, 2020). For instance, a person reads about a 
large-scale pedophile ring, reported by fringe sources to cite outrage and generate clicks, and finds it 
credible for due to any combinaAon of the psychological mechanisms outlined above. However, that story is 
not reported by mainstream outlets. As a result, the mainstream completely loses its credibility in that 
person’s eyes. AIerwards, that person is likely to get his news from fringe outlets, potenAally believing in 
more and more conspiracy theories, resulAng in a spiral. 
For instance, Melissa Rein Lively, a former Anon, said she eliminated 98% of news media aIer she got into 
Q, and was just reading outlets that were sympatheAc to the conspiracy ideology (CNN 2021e). This shiI 
was further strengthened by fringe outlets telling viewers not to entertain mainstream sources, claiming 
that other staAons are “fake news”. This — according to her — played a significant part in her staying in the 
movement for long. In a maYer of weeks, she completely changed how she processed informaAon. 
In the case of Q, destabilizing the previously 
undisputed status of facts and truth is a core element 
and one of the main strengths of the ideology 
(LaFrance 2020). MulAple Q drops explain that 
everything one knew about the world so far is false, 
and things previously considered outrageous and 
impossible are in fact the reality. The narraAve is that 
the cabal controls the media. Of course, this alone 
would not be sufficient for someone to believe Q 
drops. However, once a Q drop is believed, it sets a 
cogniAve process in moAon: the flood gates open. In 
parAcular, it triggers reactance pertaining to 
mainstream media, i.e. the reader perceives 
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mainstream media as an aYempt by an external actor to influence one’s thinking. This leads to doubling 
down on views opposing to what the mainstream says, as a reflex to maintain the autonomy of thinking. As 
a result, all informaAon reported in mainstream media or the establishment are reflexively rejected 
regardless of their content, as Anons presume a secret plan behind them. At the same Ame, this shiI in 
trust towards informaAon sources also increases the reader’s engagement with Q. Readers might realize, ‘I 
did not think the first couple of things could be true, but they are, so what else is?’ As a result, the reader’s 
mind is already made up that there is more to discover, driving them to acAvely work on finding informaAon 
which supports this assumpAon. 
At the same Ame, the Q ideology does not only delegiAmize mainstream sources, but purposefully reduce 
reactance: Q drops are mostly posted as quesAons, not as statements. This counters the reader’s general 
assumpAon that any informaAon that is given to one must have an agenda behind it. Instead, Q makes the 
reader produce the informaAon based on suggesAve quesAons, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
whatever the conclusion is will be believed. Recognizing the potenAal in this paYern and mass media’s 
shaking credibility, Michael T. Flynn, a key actor in the Q scene, established a media company called Digital 
Soldiers with a “news” website that relies on arAcles submiYed by Anons: “Digital Soldiers from all over the 
world have stepped up to fill the void where real journalism once stood” (Rosenberg 2021). 
Altogether, the currently dominant informaAon consumpAon behavior led by social media and 
postjournalism created ideal circumstances for the rise, transformaAon and spread of a variety of 
conspiracy theories. This emoAonalized yet interacAve media landscape was well uAlized by Q, leading to an 
erosion of trust in mainstream media and a rising popularity of fringe informaAon sources. 
WHY ARE CONSPIRACY THEORIES SO HARD TO DISPROVE IN THE EYES OF CONSPIRACY BELIEVERS? 
W ith a number of social-psychological processes and parAcular circumstances introduced unAl this point, it is clear how easy it is nowadays to embrace conspiracy theories. Yet with some of the far-
fetched claims made by many conspiracies, the quesAon arises why and how conspiracy believers do not 
recognize obvious falsehoods. The theory of moAvated reasoning — closely related to the epistemic moAve 
— provides a plausible answer, parAcularly when considering the ideological structure of most conspiracies. 
(1) MOTIVATED REASONING 
Most of our beliefs tend to originate from intuiAons, emoAons and heurisAcs, instead of an analyAcal and 
raAonal evaluaAon of available informaAon (van Prooijen et al. 2020). These two systems (intuiAon & 
analyAcs) make up our cogniAve system, and while the intuiAve system creates a belief almost instantly 
upon recepAon of informaAon, the raAonal system takes a longer Ame. AIer all, humans do not have 
enough cogniAve capaciAes to interpret everything analyAcally. However, studies have found that once a 
belief has been formed based on the first impression, acAve mental effort is required to “unbelieve” or 
change it, because people want to maintain a coherent worldview (see epistemic moXve). (ibid.) Also, if the 
new informaAon supports our previous beliefs, it is more likely to be accepted; whereas informaAon that 
contradicts prior beliefs is less likely to be accepted (Paul & MaYhews 2016). The laYer scenario is a 
cogniAve challenge that one has to cope with and resolve: one can either adjust their beliefs, which is costly 
from a cogniAve perspecAve, or they can find ways to reject the informaAon. Therefore, once a conspiracy 
claim is believed through intuiAve thinking (due to biases, heurisAcs or emoAons), analyAcal thinking is used 
to raAonalize and jusAfy the iniAal conspiracy by moHvated reasoning, i.e. creaAng extensive theories based 
on speculaAons and/or valid arguments, or a mix thereof. (van Prooijen et al. 2020) While these made up 
arguments may be correct and factual, the inferences made based on them are mostly false. The rejecAon 
of informaAon contradicAng pre-exisAng beliefs can happen by discrediHng the source of the contradicAng 
informaAon, or finding evidence and arguments that reinforce one’s beliefs. MoAvated reasoning also 
explains why many conspiracy theories have extensive lists of arguments, regardless whether they are 
logically consistent and plausible, which require analyAcal thinking: once a conspiracy is believed by 
intuiAon, analyAcal thinking is more likely to support it than to reject it. (ibid.) 
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MoAvated reasoning: if the “plan” fails to materialize, Anons always find an explanaAon to keep the conspiracy alive. 
In this context, a key finding is that the likelihood of false informaAon being believed or raAonalized rises 
when it is supported by (false) evidence, as the presence of evidence oIen overrides the quality of its 
arguments (Paul & MaYhews 2016). Pre-exisAng beliefs thus influence which informaAon to consider and 
what value to ascribe to it. Nowadays, it is fairly easy to find at least some evidence for most conspiracy 
theories, which are then valued more than evidence contradicAng the conspiracy. Indeed, conspiracy 
theories never disAnguish between trustworthy experts and untrustworthy sources on YouTube, profiAng 
from the fact that most educaAonal systems do not focus enough on equipping students with the necessary 
skills to navigate today’s media landscape (Wesolowski 2021). In sum, conspiracy beliefs are formed based 
on intuiAve thinking, but are then jusAfied, raAonalized as well as maintained using analyAcal thinking; 
hence once a conspiracy is believed, it can be extremely hard to change these beliefs. 
In the case of Q, there are over 5000 Q drops that can be drawn on as “evidence” supporAng whatever 
informaAon was intuiAvely believed. In addiAon, many successful Anons that the community relies on for 
interpretaAons use some kind of pseudo-evidence, that is seemingly plausible and objecAve, yet in reality is 
not. For instance, a key Q player under the name of “MilSpecOps Monkey” is a military veteran known in 
the Q scene for using open-source plavorms showing military air traffic in real Ame in order to interpret 
current developments. He would oIen make inferences about secret operaAons based on airplane 
movements. Before the Capitol insurrecAon, he predicted that the military was in control and Trump had 
declared marAal law, because there was out-of-the-ordinary air traffic (MonkeyWerxUS 2020a; 
MonkeyWerxUS 2021). This might seem plausible; aIer all, he uses legiAmate data. However, military 
airplanes on secret operaAons would have their transponders turned off. Any flights with a transponder on, 
obviously available to follow to the public, is highly unlikely to be involved in a military coup. Brodnig makes 
a similar point: many conspiracies are using words that exist yet are mostly unknown (Puls24 2021). This 
way, the conspiracy sounds as if it had a scienAfic basis: when one looks up the word, it can be verified that 
it exists. For instance, adrenochrome came from the movie Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, yet it is widely 
available and is not produced by children’s blood, as Q claims. OIenAmes, even the “proof” that Q 
communiAes use to confirm for their conspiracies are screenshots from science ficAon movies. In short, 
legiAmate data is used to make plausible but false inferences (ibid.). 
Another factor contribuAng to the difficulty of disproving Q claims while also helping moAvated reasoning 
was poliAcal leaders embracing and normalizing narraAves of Q in mainstream poliAcs. Some of the highest-
ranking officials in the Trump administraAon (secretary of state Mike Pompeo, deputy chief of staff Dan 
Scavino Jr., former naAonal security advisor Michael Flynn) likely played into QAnon premises on purpose to 
advance their poliAcal interests (Brewster 2021). These individuals, or at least their staffers, must have 
known about the Q conspiracies, yet decided to ignore them, or even to adjust their behavior to fuel the 
conspiracy. A prominent example is Pompeo’s scheduled tweets on his achievements, which were closely 
followed by Anons due to their expectaAon that the Ame between tweets serves as a countdown to the 
storm. While all tweets of Pompeo had hundreds of replies related to this conspiracy, hence why staffers 
must have known about it, the secretary of state made no efforts to denounce such ideas. On the contrary, 
he might have even changed the schedule of the tweets to play into the conspiracy by reducing the Ame 
between tweets according to Anons’ expectaAons, albeit it remains unverified whether this was done on 
purpose. Similarly, Scavino’s social media posts were closely related to key premises of Q narraAves, and the 
Aming of these posts also happened to coincide with Q prophecies. For instance, Scavino’s videos were 
usually 17 seconds or 1 minute and 17 seconds long (Scavino 2020a), oIen posted in the 17th minute of an 
hour (Scavino 2020b), fueling the ’17’ symbolism of Q. Another example is how Scavino posted central 
symbols of the Q ideology, such as pictures of storms, red and green lights with no added context (Scavino 
11
      ERIK HACKER      
2020c; Scavino 2020d), retweeted posts of the military whereas the green lights somewhat resembled a Q 
leYer (Department of Defense 2020), as well as a picture with a dossier in Trump’s hand with a widespread 
QAnon term “Game on” in meanwhile removed tweet (QAnon Austria 2020). Such key actors conAnuously 
posAng ambiguous signs added fuel to the fire and gave Anons hope, making it hard to exit the scene. 
An example of moXvated reasoning on a Q board. 
MoAvated reasoning is further supported by the cult-like internal system of Anons, which maintains 
cohesion and suppresses criAcal voices. Anyone disagreeing or doubAng the conspiracy theory is aYacked 
by others, discouraging any criAcism or challenge to the ideology. This even applies to previously trusted, 
key actors of the conspiracy; even Trump himself. For instance, when Marjorie-Taylor Green, a known Q 
supporter and now a Congresswoman, spoke in a way that was inconsistent with Q prophecies, the 
community immediately assumed that the enemy got to her. Similarly, when Trump released a video during 
the insurrecAon, asking people to go home, most Anons believed the video was a deepfake, raising 
concerns about Trump’s safety and whereabouts. 
If a previously trusted actor goes against prophecies, a theory is found to dismiss it. 
(2) CONSPIRACY THEORIES AS MONOLOGICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS 
Further adding to the strength of moAvated reasoning in the context of conspiracy theories, a study 
suggests that conspiracies oIen form a monological belief system (Douglas et al. 2019). This system creates 
a network of ideas that mutually reinforce each other, thereby making the network “self-sealing”. As a 
result, even when one fails to find or produce proof for one parAcular conspiracy theory, it is oIen 
explained with another conspiracy theory: simply by staAng that any informaAon that would undermine the 
group’s ideology is part of a conspiracy against the group. This is also called limited falsifiability. (ibid.) 
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The case of Q illustrates the common limited falsifiability of conspiracies for a mulAtude of reasons. Q drops 
being quesAons instead of statements resolves the issue of any prophecies not materializing. If prophecies 
do not come true, one can always claim that the answer one came up with to the quesAon was simply false; 
but a quesAon can never be false. Also, the term “trust the plan”, without ever knowing what the plan was, 
also adds to limited falsifiability: regardless what happens, it can always be part of the plan. For instance, 
Biden being inaugurated was argued to be part of the plan by Anons, under the explanaAon that Biden 
would need to finish the “crime”, and the mass public would need to witness the corrupAon before the 
cabal gets taken down; otherwise, there would be mass resistance against the storm. Another common 
jusAficaAon for Q predicAons not materializing is that falsehoods are part of the strategy to confuse the 
enemy, under the guise of purposeful disinformaAon: if Anons can figure out the meaning of Q drops, so 
can the enemy (MonkeyWerxUS 2020b). The ulAmate Q theory for prophecies failing to coming true was 
the higher instance. Q was built on ChrisAanity, as implied by the famous terms “nothing can stop what is 
coming” and “it will be biblical”. Therefore, the last opAon was to trust God (MonkeyWerxUS 2020c). 
All in all, holding on to conspiracy beliefs is the result of a variety of social-psychological processes around 
moAvated reasoning, which is further strengthened by poliAcal legiAmacy granted by key actors perceived 
credible. Moreover, the specific ideological structure of conspiracy theories form a monological belief 
system, that is almost impossible to disprove or falsify, making it harder to disbelieve conspiracies. 
Finding purpose is a significant part of conspiracy theory communiXes. 
WHAT ROLE DO CONSPIRACY COMMUNITIES PLAY? 
A s already menAoned with regard to the role of the media, conspiracy theories do not exist in a vacuum. The decentralized informaAon system implies that in addiAon to a medium, conspiracies also 
oIen involve a community, which poses the quesAon of how and why interpersonal relaXons may influence 
conspiracies. In short, these communiAes contribute significantly to embracing as well as holding on to 
conspiracies by providing a sense of belonging and purpose, oIen making ideology secondary. 
Conspiracy theory communiAes fulfill the basic psychological need of social 
belonging and contribute to stabilizing one’s idenAty. They do so by clearly 
delineaAng in-group from out-group along the perceived unique insider 
knowledge provided by the conspiracy theory, which creates a sense of group 
excepAonalism (Lee 2020). This in-group is oIen defined by two further 
features: (1) being an out-group/outsider of society, i.e. those that think 
otherwise, and (2) the shared grievance of being under threat by the 
powerful actors or even the mainstream. The laYer strengthens in-group 
bonding and makes it difficult to leave, as people perceive a danger that is 
best fought together. This underdog mentality also creates a posiAve group 
and personal idenAty as white knights and heroes, disAnguished by saving 
the children, the world, society, etc. Belonging is oIen further strengthened 
by merchandise, which contributes to the community-building aspect of 
conspiracies, as they serve as a visual indicator of the group. 
These mechanisms create the illusion of being the chosen ones, thereby raising 
self-esteem and establishing or maintaining a positive self-image. Especially for 
those that were previously lonely and isolated with a low self-esteem, it is an 
easy cure. In other words, as easy as it is to join, leaving is difficult, as it would mean the return to the previous 
isolation and self-depreciation. In addition, this positive group identity and the perceived fight for a good 
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cause also gives purpose to life, which can be a significant predictor of radicalization according to the 
significance quest theory of extremism (Kruglanski et al. 2018). 
The psychological impact of belonging:“I owe this community for my sanity”. 
In the case of Q, community plays a central part in radicalizaAon as well as in the conAnuous belief in the 
conspiracy. One of the main terms used by Anons is the infamous Where We Go 1 We Go All (WWG1WGA), 
signaling the importance of the community aspect. Another key term pertaining to the community is “digital 
soldiers”, which was possibly coined by Michael Flynn when he “compared the Trump campaign to an 
insurgency — a theme that QAnon adherents would later adopt for themselves — with an army of digital 
soldiers“ (Rosenberg 2021). This concept at the same Ame also illustrates the belief of an existenAal threat 
described above: Anons perceive themselves as soldiers that are at war. The Q community did not lack 
secret codes and concepts (e.g. white hats, the storm, 10 days of darkness, etc.) either, known only to 
Anons, that strengthened their sense of belonging and created the percepAon of being part of an elite, 
exclusive circle. The common understanding of the Q community being made up of “chosen ones” also 
created a false sense of security, believing that Q drop interpretaAons undergo “peer review”. 
WHY ARE CONSPIRACY THEORIES CONTAGIOUSLY ADDICTIVE? 
W hile it was already menAoned above that negaAve emoAons, that are consciously and strategically used in the rage economy, are known to keep us engaged, the reason behind this neurological 
process was not addressed yet. Recent findings by experts on addicAon suggest that conspiracy theories can 
become neurologically addicAve because they release dopamine, parAcularly in the context of revenge and 
gamificaAon, that are both prevalent in conspiracies. This biological process is similar to taking drugs, 
explaining why and how conspiracy theories can be capAvaAng for many people. 
Psychiatrists found that grievances — e.g. perceived or real injusAce — trigger the same area of the brain as 
narcoAcs (Kimmel Jr. 2020). Known from previous studies on addicAon, environmental clues (e.g. the place 
where drugs have been taken, or meeAng a person with whom drugs were taken earlier) also cause a 
dopamine-rush in the reward and habit area of the brain, which fires a craving in anAcipaAon of pleasure. In 
the case of grievances, our brain biologically associates them with retaliaAon, which we perceive as a relief. 
This leads to dopamine surges in the reward and habit region of the brain. An environmental clue in this 
case is for instance being reminded of a perceived injusAce, which triggers the same cravings. In other 
words, this clue  of being reminded of a grievance unconsciously causes a dopamine-rush and fires a craving 
in anAcipaAon  of further pleasure or relief through retaliaAon, regardless whether this is physically violent 
or just an unkind word or tweet. (ibid.) This can make people addicted to seeking retribuAon, just like one 
would become addicted to heroine, despite the harmful consequences of both. At the same Ame, even 
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seeing grievances becomes a posiAve experience. Labelled “revenge addicAon” by Yale psychiatrist James 
Kimmel Jr., this neurological finding may help explain compulsive behavior. In the postjournalism world, and 
parAcularly in fringe social media circles of Q communiAes, people are constantly confronted with 
propagated injusAces and emoAonalized messages meant to make the recipient outraged, which in turn 
fires a craving to retaliate in anAcipaAon of a dopamine rush. The result is repeated compulsive behavior 
with potenAal negaAve consequences. One possible consequence is verbal (or even physical) violence in 
various forms: mean posts, retweets, likes, blocking people, direct messages, etc. Another consequence can 
be digging deeper into the conspiracy theory to link the parAcular injusAce to a perceived hosAle actor, or 
to find a prophecy on how that actor will be punished. This mechanism keeps people neurologically hooked 
to conspiracies. (Kimmel Jr. 2020) 
Another insight from addicAon studies is that addicAon spreads from one person to another, as a contagion 
(ibid.). With revenge addicAon, this can take place by spreading grievances that create a desire to take 
revenge. In the instance of Trump, “because of his unique position and use of the media and social networks, 
Trump is able to spread his grievances to thousands or millions of others through Twitter, TV and rallies. His 
demand for retribution becomes their demand, causing his supporters to crave retaliation—and, in a vicious 
cycle, this in turn causes Trump’s targets and their supporters to feel aggrieved and want to retaliate, too” 
(ibid.) This creates a vicious spiral of retribuAons that has long been known to terrorism researchers (della 
Porta 2018). 
This addicAon was confirmed by Lenka, a former Anon as well as a former supporter of Bernie Sanders, who 
was outraged by Hillary Clinton winning the DemocraAc nominaAon (CNN 2021c). She was angry and felt 
injusAce about the party’s bias towards Clinton that was never acknowledged. Lenka claimed she was a 
vicAm of social media algorithms, that kept feeding her Q-related posts that would feed into the outrage. 
A radicalizaXon process that began with Q as “a form of entertainment”. 
Modern conspiracy theories are however not only affected by revenge addicAon, but quite possibly also by 
gamificaHon and game addicAon. Due to the decentralized media landscape and the above described 
process of decoding and encoding informaAon, recent conspiracy movements have become increasingly 
interacAve, essenAally serving as an invesAgaAve game. Such gamified concepts address mulAple 
vulnerabiliAes that can play a central role in the radicalizaAon with conspiracy theories. By hunAng for 
hidden clues, people suddenly feel empowered and smart, while also regaining autonomy and agency: 
finding complex symbols and connecAng the dots counteracts the perceived powerlessness caused by low 
levels of educaAon as well as struggles to understand the world. At the same Ame, clue-hunAng provides 
agency to the individual by raising the percepAon that the individual can become acAvely involved in 
fighAng against the conspiracy. For instance, a driver behind Anons’ engagement is their assumpAon that 
due to their “research”, the presumed global cabal can no longer conAnue with their evil plan, as Anons 
know about it and are working on stopping it. Another crucial mechanism of conspiracy theory communiAes 
related to gamificaAon is the constant posiAve reinforcement and instant graAficaAon through likes and 
retweets/reposts, enabled by contemporary social media designs. Briefly revisiAng the third desire behind 
conspiracy thinking, the moAvaAon to maintain a posiAve image is fulfilled to a large extent by becoming an 
acAve part of the community. PosAng “results of research” are instantly rewarded by the community by the 
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simple push of a buYon, which in turn makes the poster feel as if they gained status and recogniAon. 
ParAcularly when people are deprived of acknowledgments, such nudges paired with the acAvaAon of 
humans’ compeAAve insAncts and love of games can quickly become addicHve, driving people to engage 
more and more in this kind of acAvity, in extreme cases even taking over their lives completely. 
These mechanisms enabled by gamificaAon were also central in the case of 32-year-old Jitarth Jadeja, who 
spent over two years in the Q movement (CNN 2020). He was in “deep depression” before he got into Q, yet 
it gave him confidence, mildening his depression. Q’s success is hence likely rooted in its interacAve design, 
which acAvely involves Anons in building the conspiracy theory, instead of providing complete explanaAons: 
it is a living and breathing organism. Furthermore, given that Q does not directly interact with Anons, there 
is technically no right or wrong answer, i.e. the number of possible soluAons is infinite. This is further 
exacerbated by Q’s main premise, according to which the world as one had known before Q is an illusion, 
and no maYer how ridiculous something sounds, it may be real. Therefore, as menAoned above, not finding 
anything is not an opAon; it only implies the failure of Anons. This turns the Q movement into a sort of 
invesHgaHve role play game, in which one is a member of a secret digital army that needs to be creaAve, 
and has to think hard to save children and the world. The ideology of Q takes this a step further by explicitly 
portraying reality as a movie, with the script and ending being hidden in Q drops, waiAng to be resolved by 
those that are impaAent. The contagiousness of this addicAve design was even proven by a series recently 
released by HBO called “Q: Into the storm”. While the series aimed at shining a light on the ins and outs of 
the conspiracy, Rogers (2021) claims that even the director of the documentary series appears to have fallen 
prey to this “gamified clue-hunAng” the Q movement is known for by seeing conspiracies in everything. 
Failure is not an opXon. 
Q is hence both an acHve and passive conspiracy theory at the same Ame, with potenAal for creaAng 
addicAons. On the one hand, Anons are encouraged to get acAvely involved and hunt for clues, using 
gamificaAon and possibly resulAng in game addicAon by addressing psychological vulnerabiliAes. On the 
other hand, Q plays into revenge addicAon passively: the ideology is centered around the noAon of a plan 
being in place that only needs to be trusted: sit back, relax, and watch the best movie of all Ames; “the 
storm is coming”; and “nothing can stop what is coming” (LaFrance 2020), i.e. there is not much to do other 
than enjoying the dopamine-rush caused by perceived revenge. 
The significant impact of conspiracy theories on people’s lives. 
HOW TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES? WHAT TO DO WHEN SOMEONE BELIEVES IN THEM? 
S ummarizing what was said unAl now, there are quite a few psychological mechanisms and biases, as well as other context factors that can — however does not necessarily have to — lead to conspiracy 
thinking. Which parAcular combinaAon of these processes are required to happen, and which are sufficient 
in order for someone to turn to conspiracies, remains unknown, considering that each individual’s story is 
unique. What is certain however is that these psychological processes can serve as a potent recipe to take 
over someone’s life in a stunningly short period of Ame, with serious consequences for both the individual 
as well as their environment, potenAally even resulAng in violence. Considering how Q plays into each bias, 
and even innovates some aspects, it is no surprise that based on the START database (Jensen & Kane 2021), 
the duraAon between the first exposure to Q and commiung a crime for an ideological cause was less than 
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a year in 66,7% of the cases. With that said, prevenHon and miHgaHon become all the more important. Yet 
the first quesAon that should be asked is on ethics: (when) should one intervene? Krekó (2020) argues that 
while there are democraAc, moral and epistemic arguments for not intervening against conspiracy theories, 
a certain type of conspiracy theories needs to be challenged, namely when it is (1) harmful, and/or (2) has 
low plausibility and/or (3) is highly popular. Out of these three features, at least two should apply. 
Krekó (2020) categorizes interventions in two dimension: (1) temporal aspects, differentiating between 
prevention and harm reduction, and (2) the target of the intervention, i.e. the source/messenger (supply side) 
and the recipient (demand side). This generates four intervention options. 
Whether preempAvely targeAng the messenger or striking back, as two opAons listed by Krekó (2020), 
social media is the key to success due to its currency status (see above). Conspiracy theories are very oIen 
created and driven by griIing and money (Rosenberg 2021). The director of the SITE Intelligence Group 
even called them a “full-blown industry” (Katz 2021). In the case of Q, Michael T. Flynn for instance used his 
past as a vehicle to legiAmize his conspiraAonal views on the “deep state cabal in Washington” to take over 
the Q movement as an informal leader that many looked up to. His moAve is however quesAonable. While 
the above described circumstances (“Flynn facts”) hint at his tendency to spread conspiracies, he is also 
admiYedly in millions of debts for his legal defense. Coincidentally (or not), shortly aIer becoming a central 
player in the scene, he started selling merchandise to the Q movement through a company called ‘Shirt 
Show USA’, while he also launched a media company called ‘Digital Soldiers’, focusing on reader-submiYed 
stories (Rosenberg 2021). Similarly, many users with immense following on social media due to their Q-
related acAviAes released merchandise, books, monthly subscripAons on various plavorms, or simply 
profited from moneAzed content (e.g. on YouTube) as well as endorsement deals from sponsors. “The 
Praying Medic” has been pushing dozens of his books on his followers (Praying Medic n.d.); “MilSpecOps 
Monkey” uploads mulAple moneAzed videos each week on YouTube and sells self-made soaps and clothing 
on his website; Lin Wood, a lawyer who launched numerous elecAon-related lawsuits propagaAng 
falsehoods based on Q, is sAll collecAng donaAons (Fight Back Law n.d.); CodeMonkeyX, also known as Ron 
Watkins, is not only a major player in Q-related social media acAvity, but at the same Ame he is the owner 
of 8kun, i.e. the plavorm on which Q was releasing Q drops (Mak 2021). Turning to Austria, the man behind 
the QAnon Austria Telegram channel asks for donaAons daily (QAnon Austria 2021). Therefore, 
deplakorming, banning, or shadow-banning (i.e. significantly reducing reach and visibility) main actors of a 
conspiracy theory from social media outlets and plavorms on which they make money (e.g. PayPal, Patreon, 
Amazon) is likely to prevent and/or stop further spread of conspiracy beliefs to a certain extent. At the same 
Ame, such tacAcs play into the conspiracy narraAve about powerful actors trying to hide the truth by 
silencing messengers. SAll, aIer the large-scale crackdown on these accounts on mainstream plavorms 
(BBC 2021), the Q scene has been struggling to agree on where to move next: some joined Parler, some 
moved to Gab, others launched Telegram channels, yet none of them were able to rebuild the following 
they had before. While the Q fever has been dying since Joe Biden was inaugurated, which certainly 
contributed to the failure to conAnue, another reason is that alternaAve plavorms are simply not up to par 
with established outlets regarding security, user-friendliness, and hurdles (Petkauskas 2021; Hazelton 2020; 
Pardes 2020). Deplavorming can thus be successful. 
Turning to the demand side, prevenAon can take place in the form of the immunisaAon of potenAal 
recipients. These types of intervenAons aYempt to address the root causes underlying conspiracy beliefs, 
i.e. powerlessness, lack of criAcal thinking abiliAes, uncertainty, lack of control, mistrust. Of course, a 
(based on Krekó 2020) PrevenHon Harm reducHon
Messenger Pre-empHve strike Striking back
Recipient ImmunisaHon Healing
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number of other factors, such as low social status or personality traits are difficult to influence. In 
treatments, focusing on individuals’ personal experiences has proven to be efficient, e.g. by encouraging 
individuals to recall experiences where they successfully gained control. Another factor that has proven to 
increase the efficacy of refutaAons and retracAons is to provide forewarning during the iniAal exposure to 
misinformaAon (Paul & MaYhews 2016). In other words, beat the disinformaAon by being first, albeit not 
with facts but with warnings. The ulAmate prevenAve measure is however the improvement of media 
literacy and criAcal thinking when it comes to picking sources. In sum, there are numerous viable ways to 
take prevenAve acAon, however, defining potenAal recipients and groups prone to conspiracies is 
challenging, and poliAcs in general tends to rather react to threats, not proacAvely prevent them. 
WHEN IT’S TOO LATE FOR PREVENTION: HOW TO HELP AND “HEAL” CONSPIRACY BELIEVERS? 
“Don’t try to change someone else’s mind. Instead, help them find their own moXvaXon to change.” (Grant, 2021) 
Krekó’s (2020) fourth opAon is healing those that already believe harmful conspiracies. Studies cited by him 
found that raAonal and ridiculing arguments tend to have at least a modest effect, yet sympathizing with 
the conspiracy’s target group had no effect at all. However, even Krekó admits that this finding on poinAng 
out the factual and logical inconsistencies being effecAve goes against the state of the art. In today’s post-
truth world, emoAons trump facts in most cases. SAll, Krekó assumes that we might see a change in this 
regard in the near future: as people are already overwhelmed with emoAonal messages in the current 
communicaAon environment, raAonal fact-based arguments may work aIer all. The three rules of raAonal 
debunking is to sAck to facts to avoid the familiarity backfire effect; to warn recipients of the falseness of 
claims before menAoning such informaAon; and to offer alternaAve explanaAons. To avoid the overkill 
backfire effect, Krekó recommends to use few but strong arguments. An alternaAve — albeit disputed — 
method is cogniAve infiltraAon, which aYempts to plant doubts about the conspiracy theory. (ibid.) 
However, according to the majority of studies, raAonal arguments usually do not work on people that 
believe in conspiracy theories (Grant 2021). Kappes, a psychology lecturer, says that while conspiracists are 
not immune to raAonal arguments, simply disagreeing with them — which is most people’s natural reacAon 
— won’t make them listen (Wesolowski 2021). On the contrary, it is likely to backfire, in that the other 
person either fights back or ends the conversaAon. As people tend to resist perceived aYempts at 
persuasion due to a process called reactance, argumentaAve debates may even strengthen the other side’s 
beliefs, making it much more difficult to change their minds (Krekó 2020). Once one embraces conspiracy 
theories, the echo chamber effect can turn it into an addicAon that takes over the individual’s life, according 
to a former extremist (Foley MarAnez 2021). This implies that the soluAon is just as difficult as with other 
addicAons, and that the individual’s social environment is largely powerless unless the individual wants to 
disengage voluntarily. Therefore, what has proven to work in the last few decades is moAvaAonal 
interviewing, i.e. helping the opposite side find their own intrinsic moAvaAon to change their view by asking 
them open-ended quesAons and acAvely listening to their answers (Grant 2021). MoAvaAonal interviewing 
requires a supporAve environment, which can help address the original vulnerabiliAes. According to 
Parianen, this can be done by establishing a common ground which gives people a sense of stability and 
security; by finding acAviAes in life which also provide a certain control to the individual; or by creaAng 
stable social bonds (Wesolowski 2021). Without dealing with these vulnerabiliAes, disengagement will 
either fail or not be sustainable, potenAally leading to other forms of destrucAve behavior.  
Another criteria of moAvaAonal interviewing is to have “a genuine desire to understand people's 
moAvaAons and help them reach their goals” (Grant 2021). In other words, this is not a direct technique to 
manipulate people, but rather a method to understand others’ standpoints beYer, that may lead to them 
changing their minds. Regarding the seung, Brodnig (2021) emphasises the importance of having one-on-
one discussions. ConfronAng someone in a group (chat) with facts as well as poinAng out contradicAons can 
come across as threatening, as the individual might feel like being cornered. It is always easier to admit that 
one has been wrong in front of one person, than in front of two or more. Considering that conspiracies 
usually affect the individual on an emoAonal level, and less so on a factual level, speaking about emoAons 
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(rather than facts and content) is recommended. In this context, asking “how” quesAons instead of “why” is 
more effecAve (Grant 2021), e.g. asking how do you feel when you hear that? An alternaAve strategy is to 
agree with the emoAons, but contradict the facts by saying: I share your concerns about X, but at the same 
Xme, do not agree with your parXcular views (Brodnig 2021). Should the discussion be focused on content 
only, one should sAll sAck to “how” quesAons, so that the opposing sides has to think and explain his/her 
views, e.g. how something may work, instead of why someone prefers that opAon. Such quesAons oIen 
shine a light on the complexity of things that conspiracy theories simplify, thereby making the opposing side 
recognize gaps in their arguments and knowledge. In the case of Q, a large number of followers were fed up 
with the repeated non-fulfillment of prophecies aIer the inauguraAon of Joe Biden. Once there is such a 
cogniAve opening, the next step is to guide the conversaAon towards elaboraAng on those alternaAves: 
“I asked R. what the odds were that he would get a Covid vaccine. He said they were ‘preYy low for many 
different reasons.’ I told him it was fascinaAng to me that he didn’t say zero.” (Grant 2021) 
WHERE TO TURN TO FOR SUPPORT? 
S hould one not be comfortable or in the posiAon to confront a family member, friend or acquaintance, there are numerous organizaAons with highly educated, experienced staff to provide assistance and 
confidenAal counseling, both for those wanAng to leave conspiracies behind and those in their 
environment. In Germany, the dedicated experts of the IniHaHve “veritas” offer personalized consultaAons 
free of charge. In Austria, the Bundesstelle für Sektenfragen provides a similar service and has already 
proven itself as a compelling agency a few years ago, when the so-called Staatsverweigerer were rapidly 
expanding in the country (Bundesstelle für Sektenfragen n.d.). Otherwise, there are also two subreddits 
dedicated to the “vicAms” of Q, forming a self-help community for both formers and those affected by the 
conspiracy theory (Reddit n.d. a.; Reddit n.d. b.). 
A WARNING SIGN FOR THE FUTURE? THE POST-TRUTH WORLD AND THE RISE OF DEEPFAKES 
A  quesAon many have been asking in the context of the recent surge of conspiracy theories is whether we are gegng a first taste of what the post-truth world is going to be like. With mental health issues 
simmering unaddressed in most countries (McKinsey 2020), the coming of the age of uncertainty, and the 
current media landscape driven by engagement and clicks, it is easy to see how socieAes could become 
more prone to conspiracy theories. Not only did Q spread spectacularly quickly among all societal groups 
(Haimowitz, 2020), even contribuAng to an insurrecAon in the USA, the pandemic has also shown how 
conspiracy theories pose a serious threat to socieAes (Schuetze 2021). More and more experts are warning 
about entering a post-truth world (McIntyre 2018), where the truth does not maYer or even exist, 
parAcularly with the emergence of deepfakes (Chesney et al. 2020). 
As explained above, deepfakes play a crucial role in the Q world: numerous Q drops refer to clones, deepfakes, 
holograms, and body doubles. When Trump’s speech did not fit the agenda, the explanation was that it isn’t 
actually Trump on the video; it is a deepfake. When Biden took office, Q boards claimed it was not him, but a 
clone, a body double, or simply an animation instead, controlled by the military friendly to Q. Anons have 
been raising awareness of such technological innovations (see screenshots above) in general, fitting the 
narrative of life being a movie, as if we were living in a matrix. In fact, besides Q, the FBI (Sewell 2021) and 
experts are concerned about deepfakes as well (Chesney & Citron 2018). There is meanwhile even an openly 
available and easy to use deep fake tool that lets users generate videos, being able to simulate another 
person’s facial expressions (wombo n.d.). As a paradox however, this growing awareness of deepfakes may 
turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy: Chesney (2021) and Citron coined the term “Liar’s dividend”, describing the 
phenomenon of people referring to deepfakes to justify their views. For instance, some mainstream politicians 
have been refusing to acknowledge evidence, claiming that it may have been manipulated (Raju et al. 2021).  
The latest South Korea scandals on celebrities’ faces being added into pornographic material through 
deepfakes (Ryall 2021), as well as the scandal around Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s face being modified onto a 
bikini picture should serve as a warning (Mahdawi 2021). Trump’s strategy of alternative facts (Wehner 2020), 
his advisor’s infamous advice of “flooding the zone with shit” (Illing 2020), or the frequently used Russian 
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firehose of falsehood propaganda model (Paul & Matthews 2016) are all signs of a significant change that 
global society might be undergoing already regarding the very basics of our cognition, with potentially grave 
consequences (Mazarr et al. 2019). Q and the conspiracy theories around the pandemic are not rare illnesses, 
they are mere symptoms: so far only affecting a small fraction of society yet indicating a lingering issue on a 
larger scale. More focus on media literacy in education is a must, and so is a comprehensive strategy for 
primary and secondary prevention targeting the entire society to address vulnerabilities that potentially lead 
to radicalization, regardless whether it is in the context of conspiracy theories, left-wing extremism, right-wing 
extremism or religious extremism. 
Deep fakes are rather popular in the Q community as ulXmate trump cards. 
As this paper began with a quote from Barack Obama on how truth does not seem to matter anymore, it is 
fitting to end the analysis with another one on facts losing their meaning in the shift to a post-truth world: 
"One of the biggest challenges we have to our democracy is the degree to which we don’t share 
a common baseline of facts.” (Barack Obama) 
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